Sami Repishti through the words of Sali Berisha, Agron Gjekmarkaj, and Ervin Salianji

The recent passing of Professor Sami Repishti, a renowned Albanian intellectual and key figure in the Albanian-American diaspora, has prompted reactions from the Democratic Party in Albania. Two party members, Agron Gjekmarkaj and Ervin Salianji, praised his contributions to the Kosova cause and Albania's decommunistization. Their recognition was commendable, yet it stirred a sense of irony and sadness.

However, since both Gjekmarkaj and Salianji are relatively new to the Democratic Party, I am unsure if their statements were made with the intention of challenging their leader, Sali Berisha, or if they were simply unaware that Repishti’s most significant opponent in Albania was, in fact, Berisha. If their remarks were deliberate, they deserve to be commended. If not, they should be more cautious and better informed about their leader’s history, given their decision to remain loyal to him.

During my research for The First Republic of Kosova, chronicling Kosova's political history from 1989 to 1999, I found numerous records highlighting Sami Repishti’s contributions to Kosova’s liberation. He frequently advised key leaders like Prime Minister Bujar Bukoshi and President Ibrahim Rugova, equipping them with vital historical and diplomatic resources. His guidance helped them navigate international diplomacy during a pivotal time for Kosova.

Together with Bardhyl Tirana, who once served as President Carter’s Chief of Staff, Repishti volunteered as a consultant for the Kosova government. Bardhyl Tirana, in a symbolic gesture, signed a contract accepting a token salary of one dollar, adhering to U.S. legal requirements while emphasizing the altruistic nature of his work.

Repishti’s commitment extended beyond Kosova. In 1996, as Albania slid toward autocracy under Berisha’s presidency, he became the leader of the newly formed National Albanian American Council (NAAC). This organization aimed to represent Albanians in the U.S. who remained loyal to American democratic values, countering the influence of “Vatra,” which had become a partisan tool under Berisha.

Berisha opposed the NAAC vehemently, even mobilizing the Albanian Embassy in Washington to discredit Sami Repishti. His paranoia led him to suspect that the U.S. government was using every available channel against him. This paranoia extended to his frustrations with Ibrahim Rugova and Bujar Bukoshi, who relied on Repishti’s support in the U.S.

An illustrative episode from the archives:

The NAAC organized a lobbying dinner in Washington on February 7, 1997, inviting Congressman Eliot Engel and other key figures who supported Albanian causes. The NAAC played a mediating role between the U.S. State Department and the Albanian-American community. Berisha, however, refused to cooperate, instructing the Albanian Embassy not to support the event. A letter from the embassy, signed by Secretary Mustafa Xhepa, accused Repishti of being a compromised figure with alleged ties to Albania’s communist regime—a baseless and deeply ironic claim against a former political prisoner and staunch anti-communist.

From The First Republic of Kosova (Pages 351–352):

On February 7, Congressman Engel, along with several other U.S. congressmen responsible for Albanian affairs, met with the National Albanian American Council (NAAC), a newly established organization that sought to connect the U.S. government with the demands of the Albanian community. NAAC emerged in response to the decline of ‘Vatra,’ the Pan-Albanian Federation of America, which had transformed into Sali Berisha’s political instrument, diverting from its original purpose and becoming a means to influence the Albanian-American community.

Given Berisha’s discord with the U.S. administration and his influence over ‘Vatra,’ the newly formed National Albanian American Council (NAAC), established by Professor Sami Repishti—a political dissident who had escaped Albania’s communist regime and resettled in the U.S.—seemed to enjoy U.S. government backing. Berisha, deeply distrustful and conspiratorial, boycotted the NAAC due to his uncertainty about its true intentions.

During Bukoshi’s visit to Washington, the NAAC organized a fundraising meeting and shared its perspectives on developments in Kosova and Albania. Professor Repishti disclosed his State Department contacts and requested the appointment of a representative for direct communication with the U.S. government. Ilir Zherka, a young Albanian intellectual and second-generation immigrant, was proposed for this role. William Ryerson, former U.S. Ambassador to Albania (1991–1994), attended the meeting, signaling U.S. government support for the NAAC. Lindita Imami, who had an extensive experience as a translation officer with Albanian delegations at the State Department and the Pentagon, was appointed as NAAC's administrator,

Efforts to establish official contacts with the Albanian Embassy in Washington proved fruitless as a result of Berisha's explicit instructions to keep the NAAC at arm's length. Adding to the challenge, the secretary of the Albanian embassy, Mustafa Xhepa, responded offensively to the NAAC's request for a meeting with the ambassador. The response insinuated that Professor Sami Repishti, a notable dissident of the communist regime and former political prisoner, may have collaborated with the old communist government of Albania.

Replying to the NAAC secretary, Mustafa Xhepa wrote: “Regarding your request for a meeting with the ambassador at your preferred date and time, I must convey that the ambassador finds it challenging to receive representatives from a council perceived as lacking credibility in the eyes of Albanian public opinion due to the involvement of individuals with compromised links to the old regime. Please treat this letter with confidentiality.”

Bujar Bukoshi was briefed on the situation, but his attempts to alleviate the tension proved futile. Berisha’s strained relations with Rugova had repercussions for Bukoshi as well. The conflict escalated to the point where the news bulletin of the Albanian Telegraphic Agency (ATA), which typically covered Kosova developments extensively, did not mention Bukoshi’s late January visit to Washington.

During this period, Berisha's relations with Congressman Elliot Engel remained frosty. Berisha rejected Mr. Engel's offer to mediate the 1996 crisis and refused to meet him in Tirana. Given Engel's support for the NAAC, this added to the perception of Berisha’s heightened paranoia.
The situation in Washington became evident: the U.S. had assumed control of the Kosova issue, isolating it from Albania by creating the NAAC, a new Albanian-American organization, to serve as the intermediary between Albanians and the Department of State. This move effectively severed all channels of communication with Sali Berisha. The strong reactions from Berisha and the Albanian Embassy in the U.S. towards the NAAC were clear signs that the U.S. had taken the necessary steps to reshape the dynamics.