In November, when the First Degree Court ruled to lift the house arrest previously imposed on Democratic Party (DP) leader Sali Berisha, the decision sparked no official comments. The only reactions came only from the Democratic Party’s headquarters and were purely political.
The DP provided two explanations for the court's initial decision. The first, and most prominent, linked the ruling to Donald Trump’s election as U.S. President. This narrative was uniformly embraced by DP members, from Berisha himself to his supporters. Concurrently, the party’s candidates for the upcoming parliamentary elections echoed this claim in unison.
The second explanation revolved around the so-called “three resolutions,” a dubious claim suggesting that right wing parties in Europe, Asia, and the U.S. had tacitly supported DP’s resolutions calling for Berisha’s release. This narrative, however, lacked credibility and was seen as an unsubstantiated invention.
Meanwhile, a more recent ruling by Albania’s Special Appeal Court—based on a prior Constitutional Court decision—rejected Berisha’s claim that the requirement to report to authorities twice a month needed parliamentary approval. This decision effectively upheld the original security measure, which obliges Berisha to make these bi-monthly reports. On this matter, there is little room for debate.
What can be debated, however, is whether the narratives around Trump’s presidency and the “three resolutions” will influence Berisha’s ongoing legal battles. If Trump’s election supposedly influenced the initial lifting of Berisha’s house arrest, could it similarly sway future rulings? Such speculation requires logic—an element often absent from DP rhetoric.
While Donald Trump’s presidency might indirectly affect Albania’s justice reform and its intersection with politics, it is unlikely to impact the direct relationship between justice and individuals. What’s expected are changes in the justice system’s efficiency and transparency in investigations.
Berisha’s claim that Trump’s presidency would save him from justice seems more like a tactic to rally supporters with false hope. However, the Special Appeal Court’s ruling has debunked this narrative, exposing a significant political deception regarding Berisha’s legal issues.
As for the “three resolutions,” they appear to have been forgotten even by their authors. Yet, the narrative has harmed the DP by revealing to supporters that the November court decision was unrelated to Trump’s election or these supposed resolutions. This has dealt a significant blow to Berisha’s credibility.
The requirement for Berisha to report twice a month to authorities is unlikely to trouble him. Instead, it provides him a platform to hold press conferences outside SPAK’s offices. His acceptance of this ruling also indicates that his initial resistance wasn’t based on a belief in his innocence but on a desire to be arrested, which he could then frame as a political move.
In the months ahead, Berisha will focus on the electoral campaign. Once it concludes and he inevitably loses, it’s predictable what his narrative will be.
The article initially appeared in Albanian titled: "Gjykata nuk u ndikua “as nga Trumpi” dhe as nga 'tre rezolutat'"
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