No freedom for Berisha, just the end of his victim narrative

The attempt to frame the Special Court Against Corruption and Organized Crime's decision to lift house arrest for former Prime Minister Sali Berisha as a victory says more about Berisha's need to maintain an illusion of progress among his supporters than about the actual significance of his release.

Previously, I noted that "house arrest" was more of a privilege than a punishment for Berisha—a measure he deliberately provoked. Politically, it allowed him to position himself as a victim of justice. Confined to his home at an advanced age, Berisha used the situation to his advantage, delivering public speeches from his window and amplifying the image of persecution. Ironically, his release from house arrest now takes away this symbolic privilege.

The Constitutional Court's earlier ruling, which imposed reporting requirements followed by house arrest, effectively restricted his ability to challenge the justice system. In contrast, the First Degree Court’s decision to lift the house arrest seems less rooted in legal reasoning and more like a political concession. However, as judicial decisions must be respected, it is now up to SPAK (Albania’s Special Prosecution against Corruption and Organized Crime) to appeal the ruling.

Contrary to conspiracy theories, I do not believe Prime Minister Edi Rama influenced the judiciary to secure Berisha’s release. Rama’s sway over Albania’s reformed justice institutions appears limited. His government and Socialist Party have seen the arrests of several former officials for corruption, and the judiciary has frequently acted independently of political interests.

For Berisha, this legal battle is far from over. The charges against him could result in lengthy prison sentences, ranging from 4 to 12 years. Moreover, a potential trial concerning his alleged role in the tragic killing of four protesters outside his office on January 21, 2011, when he was prime minister, poses an even graver threat. If convicted, this case could lead to a life sentence, provided it concludes during his lifetime.

Politically, both the government and the opposition stand to gain from Berisha’s release. Berisha, much like the "general of a dead army" from Ismail Kadare’s famous novel, struggles to maintain the illusion of a functional opposition. For the opposition, his freedom is a small victory; for the government, it is an opportunity to exploit the situation.

Berisha’s followers are also appeased by his release, as they no longer need to stage daily protests for his freedom. However, this development strips Berisha of a powerful narrative—the image of a politically persecuted opposition leader. With that alibi gone, his failure in future elections will carry even greater political weight, as he can no longer claim persecution as an excuse.

Ultimately, Berisha’s so-called freedom is symbolic. He has lost the narrative that justified his defeats, particularly the claim that house arrest undermined his political efforts. Even those condemned to death are freed from handcuffs before their execution. In Berisha’s case, his release is merely the removal of a mask, revealing a deeper struggle that remains far from over.

The article initially appeared in Albanian titled: "Berisha s’ka fituar liri, por ka humbur një alibi"