Watching Sali Berisha’s speech to a group of Democratic Party supporters living in Greece, one could almost mistake it for a meeting with members of Albania’s Greek minority who have moved there. This impression comes not only from the tone of his address but also from its content.
Berisha began by defending his administration’s agreement with Greece on maritime borders, claiming it benefited both nations. He then shifted to blame Edi Rama, who, as opposition leader at the time, had challenged the agreement in Albania’s Constitutional Court. According to Berisha, the lawsuit damaged Albanian-Greek relations. His message was clear: it wasn’t him but Rama who harmed ties with Greece.
However, history tells a different story. In the 1990s, Berisha’s actions were the source of Albania’s earliest tensions with Greece. In 1994, he escalated matters further, accusing Greek authorities of arming the paramilitary group responsible for an attack on an Albanian border post that left two soldiers dead. At the time, Berisha pointed the finger at Fredi Beleri—the same Beleri who now stands as his unlikely European ally in what has become an anti-European crusade. Berisha devoted a significant portion of his recent speech to defending Beleri, denying accusations that Beleri bought votes in the 2023 Himara mayoral election. He even blamed the Albanian government for straining relations with Greece by arresting Beleri over these allegations.
Instead of reflecting on his past actions or offering a vision for the future, Berisha gave the impression he was speaking directly to members of the Greek minority, trying to prove that he was more pro-Greek than anyone else in the room.
The irony is that the Greek minority in Albania largely supports the Socialist Party—not because of any particular affection for it but as a rejection of figures like Fredi Beleri and other representatives of Greek far-right factions. These individuals have aligned the Greek minority’s cause in Albania with the rhetoric of Greece’s Golden Dawn, a far-right nationalist party. Yet the Greek minority in Albania remains one of the country’s most peaceful and law-abiding communities. They make their political choices thoughtfully, steering clear of leaders who claim to represent them while pushing extremist agendas. Figures like Beleri, unable to garner local support, often run under the banner of Berisha’s Democratic Party to secure a seat in parliament.
Similarly, Albanian Democratic Party members living in Greece have little in common with the far right there. While they might admire New Democracy, Greece’s ruling liberal-conservative party, they are unlikely to align with extremist groups like Golden Dawn, which are openly hostile to immigrants. That Berisha appears oblivious to the fringe nature of Beleri’s politics speaks volumes.
Moreover, DP members in Greece are not interested in Berisha’s maritime agreement or his attempts to rehabilitate Beleri’s image. His speech seemed designed for an entirely different audience: members of Albania’s Greek minority who might resent the Albanian government. Berisha seemed desperate to position himself as an advocate for Greece.
This performance reflects Berisha’s psychological shift. Haunted by his confrontations with Greece in the 1990s, he now seems to believe that pandering to Greek interests will help him escape his current isolation from Western nations.
The article initially appeared in Albanian titled: "Berisha i trajton anëtarët e PD në Greqi, si dropullitë të mërzitur"
Lini një Përgjigje